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1. Overview 
Estimates of how many jobs are vulnerable to being replaced by machine vary but it is clear that 
developing countries are more susceptible to automation compared to high-income countries. 
Traditionally, blue-collar routine jobs have been automated but with the emergence of greatly 
improved computing power, artificial intelligence and robotics, a much larger scope of 
occupations are at risk. Vulnerability to automation is now based on whether jobs or tasks are 
codifiable and whether they are routine or not. Highly-trained and skilled jobs can be more at risk 
than more varied, lesser skilled jobs.  
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Manufacturing jobs have been an important source of better-paying jobs as workers move out of 
agriculture, but manufacturing is likely to generate fewer jobs than in the past due to an increase 
in automation in this sector. Low-income countries will not achieve rapid growth by shifting 
workers from agriculture to factory jobs and will need to seek new models of growth. The service 
sector is also increasingly being automated. Future employment growth is likely to come from 
jobs that cannot be fully or partially automated. Among the low skilled, some services that must 
be delivered face-to-face or require awareness and situational adaptability (housekeepers, 
hairdressers) are likely to grow. Among the high-skilled, occupations will rely on modern skills 
involving creativity and social interactions and will use digital technologies to complement their 
tasks. 
Middle-skilled jobs, often near the top of the income distribution in low-income countries, are 
increasingly being automated polarising the labour market into two groups doing non-routine 
work: highly paid skilled workers and low-paid unskilled workers. Through previous waves of 
technological advancement middle-skilled workers would have been able to seek jobs in other 
routine middle-skilled occupations. But the wider scope of routine occupations being automated 
means that the process of job creation and destruction will hurt individuals whose skills are 
substituted by technology, because they often do not have the skills required in many of the new 
jobs. Even for those who stay within the same occupations, jobs will be transformed, requiring 
modern skills. In the future, unless these people retrain and upskill, they will become an 
increasing supply for low-paid unskilled work. The change in incomes toward capital and away 
from labour is associated with increased wealth inequality where the rich will be able to invest in 
the new technology and own the robots and consequently accrue the benefits. Incentives will 
need to be found to stimulate entrepreneurship and protect workers displaced by robots whilst 
they adapt and learn new skills. 
High-income countries face large disruptions to their labour market in the near future since they 
use more technology at work and are experiencing faster changes in skill requirements. Although 
they have smaller shares of employment in routine occupations susceptible to automation, their 
higher wages make it easier for automation to be economically viable. Low and middle-income 
countries also expect substantial changes to their labour market, given their rapid technological 
adoption and large number of workers in routine occupations, but not as soon. Lower wages and 
slower technological uptake means disruptions are likely to arrive more slowly, giving more time 
for policies and institutions to adapt. Automation could be more disruptive though in these 
countries with little consumer demand and limited social safety nets.  
Increased use of robots in developed countries may compete with the labour-cost advantage of 
off-shoring to developing countries. However, evidence to-date on reshoring shows minimal 
economic benefit in developed countries with the minimal job creation that has occurred being 
mostly in high-skilled activities. Moreover, developed countries now lack supplier networks that 
some developing countries have built to complement assembly activities. Increasingly important 
are the size and growth of local markets. This means that the production of labour-intensive 
manufactures for rapidly growing markets in large developing countries that have domestic 
production linkages is unlikely to be moved back to developed countries.  
Data shows that industrial robots have primarily been deployed in the automotive and electrical 
and electronics industry (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development October 2016). 
Widespread automation is not yet occurring in many labour-intensive industries, such as 
garment-making and whilst robots have become cheaper, current cost structures of replacing 
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large pools of low-skilled workers, may drive production costs up rather than down (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development October 2016). 
Countries will need to develop modern skills among children and youth, but also retrain and 
upskill existing workers for lifelong adaptation to multiple jobs within a career. Whilst the labour 
market may change at a different pace and to a different extent in different countries, it will 
change. Education and training systems are difficult to change with reform taking many years to 
have an effect. The sooner countries prepare, the greater the digital dividends. Because skilled 
jobs are less susceptible to automation, the best hope for developing and emerging economies is 
to upskill their workforce to have skills that machines will find difficult to do. These include 
problem solving, critical thinking, learning and reasoning as well as the ability to work in a team, 
good interpersonal skills and to be creative. The worker will also need to have technical skills, 
which includes ICT skills (World Bank 2016). 
The future workforce will likely shift towards more self-employment and online work where 
employers will think in terms of specialisms rather than employees. This may benefit and expand 
access to work for women, youth, older workers and the disabled, who may prefer the flexibility 
of working from home or working flexible hours. Online work will also provide access to a larger 
global labour market. However, these workers will require protection against poor pay and lack of 
career prospects.  
Changes in the labour market will also require rethinking of social protection and tax systems 
(World Bank 2016). Workers protection will require major reforms in many countries and forward 
thinking design in countries just starting to develop social protection systems, rather than copying 
current models. The fiscal implications of robot deployment will also need to be considered to 
prevent a major hole developing in the public purse.  
The impact of technology change on the economy is considered different this time for three 
reasons: (1) the pace of change has accelerated; (2) the scope of technological change is 
increasing; and (3) unlike innovation in the past, the benefits of technological change are not 
being widely shared - real median wages have fallen behind growth in productivity, and inequality 
has increased (Frey and Osborne 2015). 
This rapid literature review found that whilst there is evidence, information and discussion of the 
impact of automation on the labour market in industrialised nations, there is much less on the 
potential impact in developing countries. The World Development Report 2016 Digital Dividends 
(World Bank 2016) was an excellent source of data and many of the figures presented are from 
this report. Whether you are a “techno-optimist” or a “techno-pessimist”, the impact of automation 
on the labour market will require long-term adjustment and policy changes to ensure the future of 
work is inclusive and sustainable and addresses increasing income inequality (Gelb and Khan 
December 2016) in an ever more automated and digital economy. 
2. The risk of automation of jobs  
In 2013, Frey and Osborne published a study examining how susceptible jobs are to 
computerisation (Frey and Osborne 2013). The probability of computerisation for 702 
occupations were estimated. About 47 percent of total US employment was estimated to be at 
risk and wages and educational attainment exhibited a strong negative relationship with an 
occupation’s probability of computerisation. Based on Frey and Osborne’s methodology and 
using data from the World Bank Development Report 2016 Digital Dividends (World Bank 2016) 
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a Citi GPS report, co-produced by Citi and the Oxford Martin School at the University of Oxford, 
showed that jobs in developing countries are more susceptible to being replaced by automation 
(Frey, Osborne et al. 2016). Across Africa, the risk of jobs being replaced by automation varies 
by country from estimates of 65 percent in Nigeria, 67 percent in South Africa to a high of 85 
percent in Ethiopia (figure 1). This compares to an OECD average of 57 percent. Countries more 
susceptible to their labour market being replaced by automation typically have lower levels of 
GDP per capita (figure 1). This report therefore warns that low-income countries are relatively 
vulnerable to automation. 
Figure 1. Susceptibility of job automation in developing countries  
 
Source: Citi GPS 2016 Technology at Work v2. 0: The Future Is Not What It Used to Be (Frey, 
Osborne et al. 2016) 
The methodology used to generate these results, however, has been criticised by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), whose own analysis gives a 
much more conservative estimate of 9 percent of all US jobs being at high risk of automation 
(over the same one- to two-decade time span) (Arntz and Zierahn). The OECD analysis used the 
same assessment of tasks at risk of automation as the Oxford/World Bank methodology but 
criticises the latter for assuming that “whole occupations rather than single job-tasks are 
automated by technology”. The OECD report argues that “this might lead to an overestimation of 
job automability, as occupations labelled as high-risk occupations often still contain a substantial 
share of tasks that are hard to automate”. Differences in risk between countries reflect cross-
country differences in workplace organisation and job content, differences in national systems for 
education and skills development, and differences in previous investments into automation 
technologies. Although estimates of job losses vary based on the methodology used, the reports 
agree that adjustment will be required in response to increasing automation and digitalisation. 
Previous advances in industrial technology have been associated with social panic (automation 
anxiety) about large numbers of job losses. The best known early example was the Luddite 
movement during the Industrial Revolution, in which a group of English textile workers protested 
against the automation of textile production which they believed would destroy their livelihood. 
There have been subsequent waves of panic over automation of the labour market including the 
introduction of computers into offices and robots on factory floors in the 1960s and the advent of 
personal computers in the 1980s. In fact, overall employment rose strongly in the long term 
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(Economist 2016). Historically, job displacement and losses from technological change are an 
integral part of economic progress. Increasing productivity, as technology replaces human labour 
but augments the skills of remaining and new workers, generates growth and frees human and 
financial resources for deployment in sectors with higher returns. It also reduces the need for 
humans to do physically hard, repetitive or dangerous work. However, in these previous 
episodes of technological advancement, workers had the option of moving from routine jobs in 
one industry to routine jobs in another and this may not be an option in the future as these 
alternatives will also be automated.  
3. “Collar-blind” technological advances 
It is well known and established that manual work can be automated. The emergence of greatly 
improved computing power, artificial intelligence, and robotics that can replace complex cognitive 
tasks and human decision making by algorithms, machine learning and other computational 
techniques though raises the possibility of replacing labour on a scale not previously observed 
(Autor 2015). Highly-trained white-collar jobs are now at risk of also being automated with rapidly 
evolving ever-smarter machines. Vulnerability to automation is no longer based on whether the 
work is manual or white-collar but whether or not it is routine i.e. technology is fast becoming 
“collar-blind”. Highly-trained and skilled jobs can be more at risk than more varied, lesser 
skilled jobs. However, whilst automation does substitute labour, automation also complements 
labour – increasing productivity, raising earnings and augmenting demand for labour (Autor 
2015). 
The impact of automation on a job depends on what is required as to whether technology either 
complements or substitutes workers in those tasks. If a job is codifiable and routine, it is likely 
that an algorithm can do that job and this occupation will disappear (labour saving) or transform 
in the future. According to Chris Wilder, Internet of Things (IoT) analyst at Moor Insights & 
Strategy in Austin, Texas, “there is no doubt that many jobs will become obsolete, or outdated as 
IoT grows. New fields and expertise will emerge. Employees must evolve to compete in a 
knowledge-based economy. Growth in field services, asset management, robotic maintenance, 
remote diagnostics and analytics expertise will off-set job losses due to the proliferation of IoT” 
(Ambasna-Jones 2015). 
Whether a job can be automated or not does not mean it will be automated. Capital cost of 
automation as well as certain jobs requiring human interaction may prevent an automatable job 
being automated. Parameters may change though as machine learning and mobile robotics 
develop rapidly (Economist 2016). 
Countries are running out of industrialisation opportunities sooner and at much lower levels of 
income compared to previous industrialising nations (Rodrik 2016). Both globalisation and 
labour-saving technological progress in manufacturing has been suggested to be behind this 
‘premature deindustrialisation’. Manufacturing’s share in GDP is lower in Sub-Saharan Africa 
today than it was in 1980 (figure 2). Over the same period in Asia, it rose in both lower- and 
middle-income countries which drove employment and economic transformation in East Asia.  
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Figure 2. Manufacturing’s share of GDP 
 
Source: Filmer et al 2014 (Filmer 2014) 
Asia needs to continue to find ways to move up the value-added chain to stay competitive, not 
just with other emerging market economies, but with advanced economies that may be 
increasingly equipped with technology (Frey, Osborne et al. 2016). Due to an increase in 
automation in manufacturing, shifting workers from agriculture to higher-paying factory jobs in the 
emerging economies in African and South American countries is less likely to achieve the rapid 
growth seen by Asian countries (Frey, Osborne et al. 2016). Emerging and developing countries 
will need to search for new growth models and upskill workforces. One possibility is service-led 
growth but many low-skill services are now becoming equally automatable.  
Data from the International Federation of Robotics showed that recent deployment of industrial 
robots has mostly been in China (figure 2). China has embarked on a government-backed robot-
driven industrial strategy entitled “Made in China 2025” in response to a shrinking working-age 
population and rising labour costs, which has dented the country’s cheap labour advantage. The 
data also shows that industrial robots have primarily been deployed in the automotive and 
electrical and electronics industry (figure 3). This will have greatest impact (reshoring) in 
developing countries, such as Mexico and any countries in Asia, that are involved in these two 
sectors. However, widespread automation is not yet occurring in many labour-intensive 
industries, such as garment-making. Whilst robots have become cheaper, current cost structures 
of replacing large pools of low-skilled workers, may drive production costs up rather than down 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development October 2016).  
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Figure 3. Deployment of robots by country and industry 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD 2016 Policy Brief no. 50 (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development October 2016) 
4. Rising inequality 
Technology will complement the small share of high-skilled workers and allow them to be more 
productive and to find more rewarding opportunities and higher wages. Whereas low-unskilled 
workers will face increasing competition from redundant middle-skilled workers who don’t have 
the additional skills to switch to higher paid non-routine jobs as their jobs are automated. Returns 
to tertiary education are highest, the returns to schooling are higher for women than for men and 
returns to schooling and labour market experience are strongly and positivity associated 
(Montenegro and Patrinos 2014). The biggest risk therefore from the digital revolution is not 
mass unemployment but widening income inequality. The less educated and those less well-off 
are most vulnerable to technological changes in the labour market (figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Employment by education and socioeconomic status 
 
Source: World Bank. World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends (World Bank 2016) 
Increasingly, automation is replacing middle-skilled jobs (such as clerks, plant and machine 
operators), where most routine jobs fall, whilst high and low-skilled jobs are expanding. The 
workforce is therefore effectively polarising into two groups doing non-routine work: highly paid, 
skilled workers (such as architects, senior managers and professionals) and low-paid, unskilled 
workers (such as cleaners, service and sales workers). There is evidence of this polarisation in 
developed countries (Autor and Dorn 2013) and for the first time the World Development Report 
2016: Digital Dividends shows evidence of this effect also happening in developing countries 
(figure 5). A decline is observed in most developing countries of middle-skilled occupations; 
types of jobs often near the top of the income distribution in low-income countries, however, 
there are exceptions. Ethiopia, with a large share of employment in manual occupations, is not 
polarising and neither are other countries rich in natural resources and who are commodity 
exporters. 
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Figure 5. Polarisation of the labour market in developing countries 
  
Source: World Bank. World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends (World Bank 2016) 
Factors other than technological change are also likely to drive labour market polarisation. These 
include globalisation, urbanisation and structural transformation.  
Digital technologies can increase productivity and enhance overall welfare but how are the gains 
shared in the labour market? The share of national income that has gone to labour, especially 
routine labour, has fallen in many countries, including some developing countries, although there 
are some exceptions including Brazil (World Bank 2016). The change in incomes toward capital 
and away from labour is associated with increased inequality (World Bank 2016). The futurist 
Jerry Kaplan from Stanford University Law School admits that increased use of robots could lead 
to increased wealth inequality (Bowles 2016). The robots will be owned by the rich who can 
invest in the new technology and will therefore naturally accrue the benefits. Zero unscheduled 
downtime and resource efficiency are big advantages to the automated labour market which lead 
to greater returns (Economist 2016). Kaplan suggests that we need to incentivise the poor. One 
possible solution to high unemployment could be job mortgages – so that people who are 
displaced by robots can take out loans toward future earnings in unknown jobs i.e. people should 
be able to learn new skills by borrowing against future earnings capacity (Bowles 2016). 
5. Pace of technological change 
Implications of technological change depends upon the pace at which it happens. The use of 
automation and robotics appears to have accelerated since the global financial crisis propelled 
by three main drivers (Frey, Osborne et al. 2016). First, rapid wage gains (plus aging 
populations) in large-manufacturing-producing countries, especially China, have induced demand 
for automation. Second, the prices of hardware and enabling software have declined markedly, 
making it an increasingly attractive investment. Third, technological advances have increased the 
scope and usability of robotics, making robots smarter, safer and more applicable across a 
broader range of processes delivering more consistent and better product quality. These drivers 
increase the scope for labour displacement and outsourcing.  
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The share of occupations that could experience automation is higher in developing countries 
than in more developed nations, where many of these jobs have already disappeared but it will 
take longer in lower-income countries where wages are lower, where there is a larger share of 
manual nonroutine labour and technology is adopted slower (figure 6). Investments here in 
technology will be less profitable for firms.  
Figure 6. Share and pace of employment that can be computerised 
 
Source: World Bank. World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends (World Bank 2016) 
6. Impact of automation on offshoring to low cost regions 
The increased use of robots in developed countries competes with the traditional labour-cost 
advantage of developing countries (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
October 2016). Developed countries may reshore economic activities to regain international 
competitiveness in manufacturing and to address the decline in manufacturing employment and 
middle-skilled occupations in their own countries. Consequently, this could  lead to a reduction in 
output and employment in the manufacturing sector of developing countries impacting on their 
industrialisation strategy for development (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development October 2016). However, evidence on reshoring that has happened, especially in 
activities where automation and other technological advancement are important for production 
processes, shows minimal economic-wide benefits (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development October 2016). Reshoring has mostly been accompanied by capital investment, 
such as in robots, with the minimal job creation that has occurred being mostly in high-skilled 
activities, contributing to polarisation. Moreover, developed countries now lack supplier networks 
that some developing countries have built to complement assembly activities.  
Offshoring continues to take place with cheaper labour-costs still a factor in firms decision-
making on where to locate production, especially of goods with a high labour content. But 
increasingly important are factors such as the size and growth of local markets. This means that 
production of labour-intensive manufactures for rapidly growing markets in large developing 
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countries that have domestic production linkages is unlikely to be reshored (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development October 2016).   
Internet-enabled offshoring is an important source of jobs in developing countries and especially 
for women (World Bank 2016). These jobs are commonly in business processing - jobs that can 
be broken down into routine tasks but also those requiring high skills and judgement if they can 
be reliably performed and monitored remotely. Almost half of business process outsourcing 
(BPO) is in banking and financial services e.g. bookkeeping, and another 20 percent is in high-
tech and telecommunications e.g. call centres (World Bank 2016). Some medical services are 
also increasingly becoming offshored.  
New technologies are now challenging the BPO industry as many of the characteristics that 
make jobs “offshorable” also make them more vulnerable to automation. For example, a local 
health care company in South Africa is now using Watson, IBM’s artificial intelligence system, to 
assist in customer service. However, outsourcing opportunities are increasing in other areas 
through online work, providing workers and companies with access to larger, global 
employment marketplaces. This can provide an opportunity to monetize skills that may not be in 
sufficient demand in the local economy e.g. an individual in Mongolia with expertise in web 
development (World Bank 2016). The internet connects a larger pool of individuals and firms at 
lower cost making labour markets more efficient.  However, online job search remains 
concentrated among the youth and the best educated and grows with income and is still low in 
developing countries including Ghana, Sri Lanka and Vietnam (World Bank 2016). A challenge is 
reaching lower-skilled workers. Some services, including Duma in Kenya 
(https://dumaworks.com) have implemented innovations to reach these people. They use text 
messaging and “missed calls” to connect low-skilled and informal workers to vacancies. 
Online work expands access to work for women, youth, older workers and the disabled who may 
prefer the flexibility of working from home or working flexible hours (figure 7). However, whilst 
flexibility in hours and the ability to work from home are the main advantages relatively poor pay 
and lack of career prospects can be disadvantages to this way of working. 
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Figure 7. Flexibility of online work 
 
 
Source: World Bank. World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends (World Bank 2016) 
Impact-outsourcing brings online work to vulnerable communities. For example, Samasource 
(https://www.samasource.org/), a private service provider that employs marginalised women and 
13 
youth, provides two workforce extension models to meet business needs. In 2015 Samasource 
operated in five countries, India, Kenya, Uganda, Haiti and Ghana with an average active 
workforce of 652 and a cumulative workers count of 7,190 since 2008.  
7. Education 
Investment into education could be one of the most effective policies to offset the risk of 
automation impacting labour and wealth distribution (Frey, Osborne et al. 2016). Building on a 
foundation of basic literacy and mathematics, a well-educated worker in a modern economy 
needs to have skills which include problem solving, critical thinking, learning and reasoning as 
well as the ability to work in a team, good interpersonal skills and be creative. The worker also 
needs to have technical skills, which includes ICT skills which can range from ICT specialists to 
basic ICT users, who effectively use mainstream tools needed in their working (World Bank 
2016). Workers need to be prepared for a career, not just a job, and have the ability for life-long 
learning to adapt and upgrade their skills to ever-changing environments. This will require 
mechanisms for lifelong learning outside of the formal education system, including an increase in 
online learning to improve skills across age ranges. 
Education systems have been slow to respond to the rapidly changing types of skills needed in a 
modern economy (World Bank 2016), but many countries are starting to rethink their approach to 
education in which the teacher is no longer simply a source of information, but must teach 
students on how to find information and apply it in a new and unexpected context. This requires 
changes in teacher training and there are many examples of how digital technologies can assist 
both teachers and students. Technology can play a role in laying the foundation of cognitive and 
socioemotional skills (World Bank 2016). For example, the Khan Academy provides resources 
for independent learning, and benefited grade four children in Mumbai by using a gaming 
approach to math teaching. The quality of teaching remains of utmost importance, and 
technology can support and guide teaching. This model was used by the for-profit Bridge 
Academy in Kenya and elsewhere, where scripted instruction and automated administrative 
tasks help provide education at low cost. Frey suggests that governments “should not try to 
protect current or future jobs.” Instead, he says “it is crucial that governments take steps to 
reduce the cost of education while improving its quality” (Ambasna-Jones 2015). 
Private returns to education remain high, at 10 percent per year, despite large increases in the 
supply of educated workers in the last few decades. Returns to tertiary education are the highest 
which reflect strong demand for advanced skills. Returns are also higher for women than men 
(figure 8).  
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Figure 8. Returns to education 
 
Source: World Bank. World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends (World Bank 2016) 
As more parts of the economy rely more on the internet, the demand for ICT skills is growing 
(World Bank 2016). Returns to education are high and have been rising more rapidly in ICT-
intensive occupations compared to the rest of the economy (figure 9). Although only a small 
share of the workforce will be involved in developing software or systems design, exposing 
children to coding and basic ICT concepts can influence career choices for some and impart a 
basic understanding to many. NairoBits (http://www.nairobits.com/) is an organisation in Kenya 
that aims to promote creative and innovative use of ICT skills by young persons that would 
improve their ability to enter the labour market. Women are underrepresented in ICT and 
encouraging girls to enter this profession will increase the available workforce in fields with 
increasing demand for labour (World Bank 2016). AkiraChix http://akirachix.com/ is a not for 
profit organisation that aims to inspire and develop women at all levels from primary school to 
university to those who wish to have a career in technology to change Africa’s future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
Figure 9. Returns to education in ICT-intensive occupations
 
Source: World Bank. World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends (World Bank 2016) 
8. The Future Economy 
Rodrik asks ‘How concerned should low- and middle-income countries be about their “premature 
industrialization”(Rodrik 2016)?’ In low-income countries, industrialisation contributes to growth 
both because of the movement of workers from the countryside to urban factories and because 
manufacturing tends to experience relatively stronger productivity growth over the medium to 
long term. From this perspective, premature industrialisation is not good news for developing 
nations. The consequences are already being seen. In Latin America, as manufacturing has 
shrunk economy-wide productivity has slowed. In Africa, urban migrants are crowding into petty 
services instead of manufacturing, despite growing Chinese investment. McMillan and Rodrik 
analyse employment patterns in a broad cross-section of developing economies and find that 
labour has been moving in the wrong direction in Latin America and Africa to low productivity 
services and away from high productivity activities such as manufacturing (McMillian M.S and 
Rodrik 2011). However, there has been no lack of growth in the developing world since the mid-
1990s driven not by traditional industrialisation but by capital inflows, external transfers or 
commodity booms, which raises questions about their sustainability (Rodrik 2016). 
Digital and mechanical technologies, and deindustrialisation, mean that the manufacturing sector 
is likely to generate fewer jobs than in the past, especially for unskilled workers (World Bank 
2016). In the absence of sizable manufacturing industries, these economies will need to discover 
new growth models and upskill their workforce. One possibility is services-led growth. Many 
services, such as IT and finance, are high productivity and tradable, however, these services are 
typically highly skilled and do not have the capacity to absorb, as manufacturing did, the type of 
labour that low and middle-income economies have in abundance (Rodrik 2016). Moderate 
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growth is possible, as developed countries have grown at rates between 1.5 and 2% per annum 
despite manufacturing decline, but catching up will require higher growth rates. 
The most important public policy response is to help everyone gain the skills that technology 
complements, and not those that technology replaces to prepare workers for the modern world of 
work (Santos 2016). New fields and expertise will emerge and employees must evolve to 
compete in a knowledge-based economy. Growth in field services, asset management, robotic 
maintenance, remote diagnostics and analytics expertise will off-set job losses due to the 
proliferation of IoT (Frey, Osborne et al. 2016). 
Unemployment in low and lower-middle-income African countries is low as most Africans cannot 
afford to not work (Filmer 2014). The unemployment rate is highest among university graduates, 
who mostly come from the top end of the income distribution. In Sub-Saharan Africa about 16 
percent of the labour force receive a regular wage divided roughly equally between the public 
and private sectors. The industrial sector (mining, manufacturing and construction) accounts for 
less than 20 percent of wage jobs (about 3 percent of total employment) (Filmer 2014). Despite 
rapid growth in formal wage sector jobs, most jobs are on family farms (62 percent) or in 
household enterprises (22 percent), often with very low incomes. Increases in wage employment 
is expected to come from continued diversification of output and exports and from increased 
domestic demand for services as incomes grow. Service employment is expected to grow faster 
than industrial employment, where most nonfarm employment will be created. However, because 
this growth comes from such a small base, it will not be able to absorb the estimated 11 million 
youth expected to enter Africa’s labour market each year. The World Bank Youth Unemployment 
in Sub-Saharan Africa report suggests that to boost young person’s earnings, government needs 
to speed up overall business climate reforms, strengthen basic education, and male land, 
infrastructure, training and financing more accessible (Filmer 2014) 
In terms of employment in developing countries the ICT sector is small, it employs on average 1 
percent of the workers (figure 10), has high entry barriers and remains male dominated. Although 
the sector is not labour intensive, ICT jobs pay well and can generate additional jobs through 
consumption and production spillovers (World Bank 2016). The median hourly earnings in the 
ICT sector and in ICT occupations are 1.5 times higher than in urban non-ICT sectors or non-ICT 
occupation in developing countries. The high pay reflects a workforce that is better educated 
than average and also likely reflects the relative scarcity of ICT workers in some countries, 
driving up the skill premium (World Bank 2016). These high-paying jobs create more demand 
and new jobs outside of ICT with many of these additional jobs being low or medium-skilled 
occupations in local services such as retail cleaning and food preparation (World Bank 2016). 
For example, Hormuud Telecom, the largest operator in Somalia, employs 5,000 staff but 
supports 25,000 agents (World Bank 2016).  
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Figure 10. Employment in the ICT sector in developing countries 
 
Source: World Bank. World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends (World Bank 2016) 
Policy intervention will be necessary, such as labour market adjustment policies to support 
workers whose job (or the task-content of their job) is changing, and to adapt, expand and 
upgrade systems for skills development for people entering the workforce (Gelb and Khan 
December 2016). Active labour market policies, including upskilling, training and education are 
necessary to ensure that job losses deriving from technological advances and globalization of 
supply chains are offset by other employment opportunities (International Labour Office 2015). 
Changes in the labour market also requires rethinking of social protection and tax systems 
(World Bank 2016). The modern on-demand economy will lead to more independent contracting, 
casual work, freelancing and other new forms of work in online labour markets. In most countries, 
social insurance schemes for pensions, unemployment and health are tied to formal employment 
paid through payroll taxes. Strict labour regulations common in developing countries, and 
overreliance on labour taxation will encourage faster automation by making hiring more 
expensive. The 2016 World Bank Report advises that it would be better to strengthen workers 
protection by delinking social insurance from the labour contract (World Bank 2016). This will 
require major reforms in many countries and forward thinking design in countries just starting to 
develop social protection systems, rather than copying current models.  
Robots and machines do not pay national insurance and income tax. The fiscal implications of 
robot deployment need to be considered. Without the introduction of a major tax on robots as 
capital equipment, robot-based manufacturing cannot boost the fiscal revenues needed to 
finance both social transfers, to support workers made redundant by robots, and minimum 
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wages, to stem a decline in the living standards of low and medium-skilled workers (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development October 2016). 
Key websites 
The Oxford Martin Programme on Technology and Employment 
http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/research/programmes/tech-employment 
The Oxford Martin Programme on Technology and Employment was established in January 2015 
toresearch implications of a rapidly changing technological landscape for economies and 
societies.  The programme aims to provide evidence on the following: 
•  How technology is transforming companies and industries; 
•  Why some places are better at adapting to this transformation; 
•  Related implications for living standards, inequality and social mobility. 
Digital Development Summit 2017                                                      
http://www.ids.ac.uk/events/digital-development-summit-2017 
An inaugural Digital Development Summit to explore the future of work in a digital world. 
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